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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, my colleague John Beckerman and I had an
experience shared by very few legal academics. We mailed the galley
proofs of an article that we had written to the staff of a Senate
Committee and then saw the Committee, the Senate, and the full
Congress enact into law a bill that included all of the
recommendations in our article. The article was Let the Money Do the
Charles E. Ares Professor Emeritus, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of
Arizona; Of Counsel, Bernstein Litowitz Berger and Grossman LLP. The author thanks John
Beckerman, Jim Cox, Luis Delatorre, Marc Gross, Jerry Silk, and the commentators at the
Institute for Law and Economic Policy's 2007 annual conference for helpful comments. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author, who also accepts responsibility for any errors.
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Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
Securities Class Actions;1 the law was the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 2 The relevant provisions of the PSLRA,
now generally known as "the lead plaintiff provisions," prescribe
procedures for the selection of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in
securities class actions.3
For years, I have thought about writing something that sets
forth the unique history of the lead plaintiff provisions, describes how
closely developments pursuant to those provisions have met our
expectations and what surprises have occurred, and assesses how well
those provisions have worked in a "real world" setting. The invitation
to participate in this Symposium, held little more than a decade after
the lead plaintiff provisions went into effect, provides me with the
opportunity to do just that.
This Essay has six parts. Part I describes the questions that
led Professor Beckerman and me to undertake research concerning
the dynamics of securities class actions and summarizes our findings
and recommendations. Part II sets forth the story of how our
recommendations came to be enacted into law. Part III describes post-
enactment developments that have been consistent with our
expectations, while Part IV describes post-enactment developments
that we did not anticipate. Part V contains some thoughts about
whether, had Congress followed a more deliberative process before
enacting our recommendations into law, it could have come up with a
better approach for organizing the process by which lead plaintiffs and
lead counsel are appointed in securities class actions. Part VI sets
forth a few recommendations for change.
I. OUR RESEARCH
Three things sparked our interest in securities class actions
and the role institutional investors play therein. The first was that
institutional investors owned a majority of the stock of publicly held
corporations and accounted for a larger portion of trading, yet
appeared to have played little, if any, role in securities class actions. 4
This struck us as anomalous, especially given institutional investors'
1. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053
(1995).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2000).
4. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2056.
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steadily increasing participation in other aspects of corporate
governance. 5
The second was the growing controversy over whether
securities class actions serve investors' interests. An article by Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, helped fuel this controversy, 6 as did articles
by other scholars suggesting that, because lead plaintiffs were often
little more than figureheads, agency costs in securities class actions
were extremely high.7 Committees in both houses of the 103rd
Congress had held hearings relating to this issue but had
recommended no legislation.8 However, when the Republican Party
took control of both houses of Congress after the 1994 elections,
legislative action seemed increasingly likely. 9
The third was my experience representing a shareholder who
objected to the settlement of a securities class action against Warner
Communications, Inc. ("WCI") on the grounds that the settlement
exculpated Steven Ross, Warner's CEO, from liability, despite the fact
that his sale of $20 million in WCI stock constituted the strongest
evidence that WCI had acted with scienter. 10 Although we succeeded
in showing that the factual justification the parties had advanced for
5. See id. at 2056-57.
6. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 534-48 (1991) (noting that in securities class action suits,
litigation decisions typically had been made by the plaintiffs' lawyers, not by the representatives
of the class).
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 887-88 (1987)
(discussing the fee structures for plaintiffs' attorneys, and explaining that under the percentage
formula and the lodestar formula, the attorney has an incentive to maximize his own profit);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
685-86 (1986) (recognizing the serious principal-agent problem arising from the fact that the
plaintiffs attorney, rather than the client, had the discretion over whether to commence a suit);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
17-18 (1991) (noting the disparity of interest between the principal and the agent, and
suggesting means of reducing the agency cost); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 727, 727-40 (1995) (arguing that diversified investors realized no significant
benefits from securities class actions).
8. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2055.
9. John Beckerman and I had completed our research prior to the 1994 elections, at a time
when Congressional action seemed unlikely. We directed our suggestions for reform to the
federal judiciary, which we argued had authority to implement them under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and through the court's inherent authority to control certain
aspects of civil litigation. See id. at 2105-09.
10. See id. at 2067-71 (illustrating "the extremes to which courts go to approve class action
settlements").
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exculpating Ross was false, the court approved the settlement,
arguing that "a bad settlement is almost always better than a good
trial."11 This experience led us to question the wisdom of relying on
judicial approval of settlements, the principal procedural mechanism
then in place for ensuring that class members' interests are protected.
Professor Beckerman and I reviewed prevailing securities class
action practices and procedures, including the process most courts
used to appoint lead plaintiffs and lead counsel, and concluded that
they effectively precluded institutional investors from becoming
actively involved in securities class actions. More specifically, we
found that:
* The filing of securities class actions rarely received any
publicity; 12
" Courts tended to appoint as lead plaintiff the first member
of the purported class to file a complaint and to appoint as
lead counsel a law firm with whom that early filer had a
pre-existing relationship. Many of the early filers appeared
to be "figurehead plaintiffs" who had purchased (or sold)
only a modest amount of stock in the corporation
responsible for the alleged fraud and had filed, or
authorized their lawyers to file, complaints within hours of
the announcement of unanticipated bad (or good) news, and
an associated substantial drop (or increase) in the price of
that corporation's stock; 13
* Other class members often did not even know a purported
class action was being litigated until they received notice of
a proposed settlement, the court's preliminary approval
thereof, and defendants' conditional agreement to
certification of the proposed plaintiff class; 14
11. In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 798
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986). But see In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4293 VRW, 2007 WL
4249902, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007) (quoting Warner, but then rejecting a proposed
settlement after noting that "a good epigram could, in this case at least, make for a bad result").
12. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2100.
13. See id. at 2060-63.
14. See id. at 2100 (noting that in some class actions the parties "may attempt first to
resolve whether the plaintiffs complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted" before
entering into settlement negotiations).
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* As evidenced by Warner Communications, a court that had
given preliminary approval to proposed settlements
generally was reluctant to change its mind.15 A few
institutional investors had objected to proposed settlements,
but had met with little success. 16
We also found that institutional investors had demonstrated
minimal interest in securities class actions, perhaps because
settlements generally were relatively small (rarely exceeding $20
million) and because the prevailing belief (or mythology) was that
small investors were the primary beneficiaries of class action
settlements. However, when we reviewed data from twenty-two
settled cases detailing claims for allowable losses, we found that a
relatively small number of investors, mostly institutional, accounted
for a majority in dollar value of the claims filed and that the two or
three largest claimants, which again were predominantly institutional
investors, each accounted for a significant percentage of the dollar
value of all claims filed.1 7 We also found that, although claims by
relatively small investors-those with allowable losses of up to
$5,000-accounted for more than seventy percent of all claims filed,
they accounted for an average of only about twelve percent of the
dollar value of all claims filed.' 8
These data led us to conclude that if class action procedures
could be reformed to make it easier for institutional investors with
large losses to become lead plaintiffs and to select the attorneys who
would represent the class, those institutions would have an economic
incentive to retain and to monitor class counsel so as to reduce
substantially the agency costs associated with securities class action
litigation.' 9 We further argued that federal courts, largely through
constructive reinterpretation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
15. Id. at 2067-71.
16. See id. at 2104-05.
17. In all but a few cases, settlement proceeds were distributed pro rata as a percentage of
claims for allowable losses. The exceptions were a few cases we found in which settlements were
structured in a fashion that was prejudicial to the interests of investors with large losses. See id.
at 2074-79.
18. Id. at 2094. We also noted that if one made the reasonable assumption that allowable
losses equaled roughly 10% of the amount investors paid for securities, this category included all
who had invested up to $50,000 in a given company's stock. For most individuals, this would
amount to a rather large investment. Investors with allowable losses of up to $1,000 accounted
for an average of less than 1.5% of valid claims filed. Id.
19. See id. at 2121-23. We also demonstrated that claims by critics such as Janet Cooper
Alexander that the merits did not matter when securities class actions were settled were deeply
flawed. See id. at 2080-84.
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Procedure, had the authority to implement the three reforms we
believed were needed. More specifically, we suggested that:
" Whenever a purported securities class action was filed, the
court should require the plaintiff to publish a public notice
of filing and should give members of the purported class a
reasonable period in which to apply to be named lead
plaintiff;
* The court should appoint as lead plaintiff the plaintiff or
applicant with the largest financial interest in the action,
provided that applicant otherwise appeared to be qualified
to serve as a class representative, and the court should then
allow the lead plaintiff (subject to court approval) to select
and retain lead counsel;
* The court should protect applicants-in particular,
institutional investors seeking to be appointed lead
plaintiff-from harassment by allowing other plaintiffs or
applicants to take discovery only where they could show
that they had good cause to believe an applicant would not
be a typical or adequate class representative.
II. FROM ACADEMIC CONCEPT TO STATUTORY LAW
Just as we were completing editorial work on our article, which
the Yale Law Journal had accepted for publication, Congress actively
was considering legislation to reform various aspects of securities
class action litigation. One issue on Congress's agenda was how to end
the unseemly "race to the courthouse" that existing case organization
practices seemed to encourage. 20
20. Unbeknownst to us and to Congress, it appears that in hundreds of cases that had been
filed by predecessors to Milberg Weiss LLP (which, before 1996, was by far the most prominent
plaintiffs' securities class action firm), the named plaintiffs were individuals to whom those firms
had promised to pay kickbacks equal to a percentage of any attorney fees they were awarded. In
exchange, the individuals agreed to allow the firms to file class action complaints in their names
or the names of cooperating family members and associates. See Second Superseding Indictment,
United States v. Milberg Weiss LLP, CR 05-587 (D)-JFW (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2006) [hereinafter
Milberg Indictment]. Milberg Weiss has pled not guilty to those charges, but several past
partners of that firm or its predecessors have pled guilty to charges that they engaged in conduct
essentially identical to that alleged in the Milberg Indictment.
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We sought to testify about this issue before the relevant
subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee, thinking that our
proposal would constitute a more effective solution than the approach
included in the bill that the House of Representatives had passed. 21
The subcommittee staff responded that the hearing schedule was fully
committed. They suggested that we send them a copy of our article-
an invitation that struck us as polite, but unlikely to lead to serious
consideration of our proposals. Consequently, we decided to send the
galley proofs of our article not only to the subcommittee staff, but also
to Robert Giuffra, Chief Counsel of the Senate Banking Committee,
with whom I had several conversations when he was an articles editor
of the Yale Law Journal.
Giuffra "felt the article's ideas had potentially broad appeal to
the various constituencies [interested in reforming case organization
procedures]. '"22 He also concluded that the reforms suggested in our
article were more likely to lead to constructive changes than those
included in the bill the House had passed.23 Giuffra circulated copies
of the article to the members of the Banking Committee, and he
directed staff to draft legislation that would implement our three
principal recommendations. 24 The Committee thereafter reported out
a bill that substantially mirrored our recommendations, providing for
early notice of the filing of a purported securities class action and
selection as lead plaintiff of the plaintiff or applicant with the largest
financial interest, allowing the lead plaintiff to appoint and retain
lead counsel, and restricting discovery directed at applicants for
appointment as lead plaintiff.25
Some Senators-and others-who were critical of class action
litigation may have supported enactment of the proposed lead plaintiff
21. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted).
22. Andrew Longstreth, Insecurity, FUTURE LITIG., Fall 2003 (on file with Vanderbilt Law
Review).
23. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. §§ 202-03 (1995) (including provisions that would have
required courts hearing class actions to appoint a guardian ad litem or plaintiff steering
committee for the class, limited the number of class action complaints that a "professional"
plaintiff could file annually, and disqualified as a class action plaintiff an investor with only a
trivial amount at stake). Only a modified version of the professional plaintiff provision was
included in the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000).
24. The staff of the Securities Subcommittee also contacted us, asking each of us to
comment on draft legislative language. We both agreed to do so.
25. See S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995) (accompanying S. 240). The Committee generously
acknowledged that it based the lead plaintiff provisions on our article. Id. at 11 n.32. Moreover,
"[allthough Congress did not refer to the Weiss/Beckerman article as an 'authoritative' part of
the legislative history[,] courts interpreting [those provisions] have nevertheless taken note of
Congress's heavy reliance on the Weiss/Beckerman article and given it considerable weight when
construing the provision." Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 154 (3d Cir. 2002).
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provisions for reasons that they should have realized were misguided.
These critics anticipated that the new legislation would lead to a
reduction in "burdensome" class actions by encouraging large
institutional investors, many of which they believed were hostile to
class action litigation, to seek appointment as lead plaintiffs for the
sole purpose of moving to dismiss actions that they believed lacked
merit.26 What these critics should have realized was that the costs to
any institutional investor of pursuing such a course of action would far
outweigh any potential benefits it might realize. By so proceeding, an
institution would become vulnerable to claims by other investors (and
their attorneys) that it had breached its fiduciary duties to the
members of the purported plaintiff class. 27 An institution could avoid
the cost of defending such a claim simply by remaining a passive
member of the purported class, collecting nothing if the case was
dismissed and receiving its share of any recovery if the plaintiff
succeeded in obtaining a monetary recovery.
We have no way of knowing if this miscalculation was a
decisive factor in the adoption of the lead plaintiff provisions. What we
do know is that the Senate adopted the committee-approved bill
without amending those provisions, and the conference committee
approved a bill that, with two minor modifications, 28 included the
Senate-passed provisions. Both houses of Congress passed the bill
and, after President Clinton vetoed it, passed the bill again by
supermajority vote.29
26. I base this speculation on several private conversations, including one with a then-
sitting SEC Commissioner who told me that this is what he expected would occur. Some
plaintiffs' lawyers, as well as Senators sympathetic to their point of view, might have shared this
expectation. Cf Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2111 n.271 (quoting a letter from a
plaintiffs' lawyer arguing that institutional investors generally have close relationships with
public companies and "do not want to be perceived as hostile to corporate management"). On the
Senate floor, several Senators who generally were supportive of the plaintiffs' bar argued against
enactment of the proposed new case organization procedures. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 34
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 ("Several Senators expressed
concern during floor consideration ... that large investors might conspire with the defendant
company's management.").
27. See Armour v. Network Assocs., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting
that a lead plaintiff must be capable of carrying out the fiduciary duties a class representative
owes to the represented class, and that "[p]rimary among these duties is the obligation of the
class representative to select class counsel and monitor the conduct of class counsel throughout
the litigation").
28. The Conference Committee added a provision specifying that only the first plaintiff to
file a class action is required to publish a notice of requiring, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(ii),
and a limited restriction on "professional plaintiffs" serving as lead plaintiff in more than five
actions during any three-year period, see id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi).
29. Neil A. Lewis, Securities Bill Becomes Law as the Senate Overrides Veto, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1995, at 39.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS CONSISTENT WITH OUR EXPECTATIONS
In our article, we expressed the hope that if courts decided to
implement the reforms we recommended, institutional investors
would begin to seek appointment as lead plaintiff in at least some
securities class actions and, if appointed, then would act as reasonably
diligent litigation monitors, negotiating arm's length fee
arrangements with plaintiffs' attorneys and overseeing the
prosecution and settlement of the actions in which they were involved.
We recognized, though, that institutional investors might choose not
to get involved because activism along these lines would have the
potential to generate costs as well as benefits for institutions that
chose to act.30
We did not need to wait to see what the courts would do
because, as described above, Congress decided to implement our
recommendations legislatively. Institutional investors' reactions, not
surprisingly, were somewhat slower in developing. 31 First, they had to
process the possibility that they could become lead plaintiffs. As large
institutions, often with complex governance structures, they needed to
analyze the legal and financial implications of taking on that
responsibility. Understandably, too, many institutional investors were
reluctant to be the first mover; their preference was to allow other
institutions to seek lead plaintiff status and see what they could learn
from their experiences.
Over the years, though, institutional investors in steadily
increasing numbers have become more comfortable with the idea of
serving as lead plaintiff, and have sought and received appointment to
30. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2109-26 (explicating potential costs and
benefits of institutional activism). That some institutions were unlikely to get involved was
presaged by a colloquy between Senators Bennett and Dodd, specifying that the Senate bill did
not impose any obligation on institutional investors to seek appointments as lead plaintiff. See
141 CONG. REC. S9109-05 at 9115 (daily ed. June 19, 1995). A statement to the same effect was
subsequently inserted into the Conference Report. See H.R. REP No. 104-369, at 34 (noting that
although the "provision does not confer any new fiduciary duty on institutional investors," the
provision is intended to "encourage institutional investors to take a more active role in securities
class action lawsuits"). Robert Pozen, then-General Counsel to the manager of the Fidelity
mutual funds, told me in a private telephone conversation that he drafted the text of the Senate
colloquy.
31. See Jill Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
533, 542-44 (1997) (commenting on the small number of institutions that had become involved in
the year, or eighteen months, period following passage of the PSLRA). See generally Elliott J.
Weiss, Comment: The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 561 (1997) (discussing reasons why the pace of change was not
surprising).
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that position.32 Most of these institutions have been public or union
pension funds, but some private sector funds also have been appointed
as lead plaintiffs. Moreover, the recent increase in the number of
activist hedge funds may well presage a similar increase in the
number of private sector funds that seek to increase returns by
becoming lead plaintiffs in class actions in which they have
substantial financial interests.
Consistent with our expectations, institutional investors that
have sought appointment as lead plaintiff generally have negotiated
fee arrangements with the law firms they have retained that provide
for percentage fees far lower than had been the norm prior to passage
32. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A. C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The
Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH.
U. L.Q. 869, 877-78 (2005) (comparing class actions brought in1991-1995 with those brought in
1996-2000, and noting that "recent data suggests that institutional participation is increasing');
James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and... There Are Plaintiffs:
An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV 358 (2008)
(presenting an empirical study on the effect of institutional investors on settlement amounts,
and noting that there has been increased activity by institutional investors as lead plaintiffs);
Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public
Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions (St. John's Univ. Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research, Working Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (examining claims that increased participation by institutional
investors yields larger recoveries, better monitoring, and lower attorneys' fees). A related
development is that what appear to be increasing numbers of pension funds have begun to opt
out of class actions and pursue their claims in separate actions in both federal and state courts.
Keith L. Johnson, Opting Out of Class Actions, SEC. CLASS ACTION SERVS. ALERT, Jan. 2007. But
see Peter M. Saparoff & Jennifer K. Alcarez, Opting Out of Securities Class Actions-Is It Worth
the Risk? (Jan. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (created
for use at the ALI-ABA Course of Study on Securities Litigation Planning and Strategies in
Boston, MA on June 7-8, 2007) (discussing several issues an institution should consider before
deciding to opt out).
We attempted to gather data that would allow us to assess comprehensively whether the
recoveries institutions have obtained through these efforts are larger or smaller than those
obtained by investors who remained in the plaintiff class. Unfortunately, we were unable to
obtain sufficient data to reach meaningful conclusions.
The data we were able to gather suggests that in some cases institutions that opted out
recovered appreciably more of their losses than passive members of the plaintiff class, while in
others they did not. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Brave New Securities Lawsuit World: Qwest Opt-Out
Settlements Exceed Class Settlement, THE D & 0 DIARY, Nov. 25, 2007, http://dandodiary.
blogspot.com2007/ll/brave-new-securities-lawsuit-world.html (pointing out that "the aggregate
amount Qwest has agreed to pay opt-out claimants exceeds the [$400 million] it agreed to pay the
class" (emphasis in original)). Another impression is that opt-outs generally have had to deal
with substantially more in the way of litigation-related costs, both direct and indirect, than have
passive members of the plaintiff class. See Saparoff & Alcarez, supra. Finally, we have concluded
tentatively that the factor to which an institution generally should give the greatest weight in
deciding whether to opt out (aside from whether its losses are large enough to justify the effort)
is whether it believes that the lead plaintiff in the action, and, more importantly, the law firm it
has selected, are committed to and capable of obtaining the largest recovery possible for the
plaintiff class.
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of the PSLRA.3 3 Many institutional lead plaintiffs also have actively
monitored class actions in which they have served as lead plaintiff and
have pushed for larger settlements, recoveries from individual
defendants responsible for corporate frauds, and governance reforms
directed at preventing corporate wrongdoing from recurring. 34
A number of law firms that specialize in representing plaintiffs
in securities class actions, including several that were formed after the
lead plaintiff provisions came into effect, have focused largely or
exclusively on securing and representing institutional clients.35 These
firms have found it increasingly important to develop "reputational
capital" as effective advocates of investors' interests because they
often must compete with other plaintiffs' firms to secure institutional
investors as clients. In our view, the dramatic increase in class action
recoveries in suits brought after 1995 is due in large part to this
dynamic, and also in part to closer client oversight of plaintiffs'
attorneys. 36 Other factors that no doubt help explain the increase in
what might best be termed "mega-settlements" are the larger size of
the corporations involved in frauds disclosed after 1995 and the
apparent increase in "aggressive" financial reporting that occurred
during the 1990s.
Securities Class Action Services regularly publishes a report on
the top one hundred securities class action settlements reached in
33. See Perino, supra note 32, at 31 ("These results suggest that public pension fund
participation does reduce fees, either because institutions are sophisticated consumers of legal
services or because of increased competition for institutional representation."). But see Choi,
Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 32, at 896-900 ("Private institutions are clearly not keeping fees in
check."). It should be noted, however, that Choi, Fisch & Pritchard not only adjusted their results
to account for the amounts recovered, but also used less current data.
34. This statement is based on numerous conversations with representatives of
institutional investors and with plaintiffs' attorneys.
35. Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., organized in 1997, is particularly prominent among the
plaintiffs' firms formed after 1995 that primarily represent public pension funds. Grant &
Eisenhofer, http://www.gelaw.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, which was organized before 1995, also specializes in representing public
pension funds, and has the largest number of such funds as clients. Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger
& Grossmann, http://www.blbglaw.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). The firm now named
Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins represents many union pension funds and some public
funds. Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins, http://www.csgrr.com (last visited Feb. 18,
2008). Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard, in their 2005 paper, reported that in the period they studied
(1996-2000), private pension funds tended to avoid the Milberg Weiss firm, see Choi, Fisch &
Pritchard, supra note 32, at 892, which included most of the lawyers who later formed what is
now the Coughlin firm.
36. I base this statement in part on my personal experiences as an attorney and an expert
witness and in part on conversations with institutional investors and plaintiffs' attorneys.
Attorneys who specialize in representing defendants in securities class actions also have told me
that the dynamics of class action litigation changed dramatically after 1995, especially in suits in
which large institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs.
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cases filed following the passage of the PSLRA. The most recent such
report, dated June 30, 2007, shows that all one hundred settlements
exceeded $50 million.37 Eight settlements ranged between $1.032
billion and $7.231 billion, another sixteen ranged between $300
million and $667 million, and an additional thirty-five ranged between
$100 million and $374 million.38 Moreover, institutional investors
served as lead plaintiffs in all of the cases that settled for more than
$1 billion, in twenty-three of the twenty-four (95.8%) that settled for
at least $300 million, in fifty-one of the fifty-nine (86.4%) that settled
for more than $100 million, and in seventy-nine of the top one
hundred (79%).39
As a number of studies have pointed out, the fact that large
settlements have become much more common does not necessarily
mean that investors have been recovering a larger share of their
losses, either in the cases involving mega-settlements or in securities
class actions generally. 40 These studies find that recoveries, on
average, whether in class actions generally or in cases where
institutions have served as lead plaintiffs, represent only a small
fraction of the losses investors have incurred and that class members
have not fared significantly better in cases with institutional lead
plaintiffs.41
In our view, the work of these scholars suffers from a serious
flaw-the econometric models they use to calculate "investor losses" do
not reflect the realities of class action litigation and settlement
negotiations. 42 One major weakness is that these models make no
37. Inst. S'holder Servs., Top 100 Securities Class Action Settlements, SEC. CLASS ACTION
SERVS. ALERT, June 30, 2007. Such settlements have no precedent in cases filed prior to passage
of the PSLRA. To my knowledge, not a single such case settled for as much as $50 million.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 32, at 894 (finding no indication of a significant
increase in recovery); Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 32, at 383 (indicating that higher
settlement amounts likely are caused by higher provable losses); TODD FOSTER ET AL., NAT'L
ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS
STAY LOW AND AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS STAY HIGH-BUT ARE THESE TRENDS REVERSING? 11
(Sept. 2007), http://www.nera.com/image/PUBRecentTrends-Sep2007_2color-web-FINAL.pdf
("Higher investor losses for more recently resolved cases explain the rise in settlements.").
41. See Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 32, at 380 (displaying a chart that provides the
percentage of losses recovered by the class according to type of plaintiff). NERA calculates that
from 2002 through 2006, the annual median ratio of settlement to investor losses ranged from
2.1% to 3.0%. FOSTER ETAL., supra note 40, at 12.
42. The scholars that have done such work do not claim that the investors' losses they
calculate can be equated with the amounts investors reasonably could expect to recover. They
also, in our view, do not emphasize sufficiently how this limitation reduces the significance of
their findings. This omission has allowed critics of class actions to cite their work in support of
claims that investors realize only trivial benefits from class actions brought on their behalf, and
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effort to take account of the allegations in the relevant complaint. Yet,
as every practicing securities lawyer knows, investors are entitled to
recover only the losses that they can prove were caused by defendants'
fraudulent conduct.43
A related weakness is that these models take no account of how
difficult it will be in each case for plaintiffs to prove deception,
materiality, scienter, reliance, and loss causation. All must be shown
for plaintiffs to prevail, and all are likely to be major points of
contention in settlement negotiations. Indeed, a common practice in
securities class actions is for the court, at some point, to order
mediation under the supervision of a court-appointed mediator44 and
for the mediator to direct the parties to prepare written submissions
addressing each of these issues before settlement negotiations begin.
A final set of problems is that these models take no account of
the proportional liability provision of the PSLRA, which greatly
reduces the likelihood that any given defendant will be liable for all
losses caused by any given fraud 45 or of the fact that, in many cases, at
least some defendants who were or may have been responsible for
significant shares of investors' losses are bankrupt or otherwise lack
sufficient resources (or insurance) to pay all or even a significant
portion of the damages for which they arguably are liable.
46
that the principal beneficiaries are plaintiffs' attorneys. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming
the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1534, 1545 (2006) (citing the 2005 NERA study, and finding that "the conclusion seems
inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly"). In re Omnivision Technologies,
Inc., No. C-04-2297 SC, 2007 WL 4293467 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007), provides an interesting
perspective on this issue. The court noted that plaintiffs' damages expert estimated total
damages at $151.8 million, while defendants estimated that plaintiff could not recover more than
$15.1 to $18.6 million, and would do so only if they prevailed on all claims. Id. at *5. The court
then concluded that the proposed $13.75 million settlement was reasonable because, after
payment of attorneys' fees and costs, plaintiffs would recover "in excess of 6% of the potential[,
which] is higher than the median percentage of investor losses recovered in recent shareholder
class action settlements." Id. A more accurate assessment of the settlement, in our view, would
have been that it amounted to between 74% and 91% of the maximum recovery defendants
estimated plaintiffs could have achieved.
43. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005) (holding that investors
must plead and prove loss causation).
44. Often a retired federal district court judge.
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2000). A defendant who is proven to have acted with actual
intent to defraud can be held jointly and severally liable, id. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A), but proving actual
intent often can be problematic, and, at a minimum, the difficulty that plaintiffs are likely to face
in doing so will be reflected in settlement negotiations.
46. The Worldcom class action, in which settlements totaled $6.156 billion, provides a
useful illustration. The corporate defendant and its two senior executives together were
responsible for most of the investors' fraud-induced losses. See generally In re Worldcom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). But Worldcom was bankrupt, and the two senior
executives, although wealthy, did not have sufficient assets to pay off more than a very small
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We recognize that it would be impractical and unrealistic for
scholars who study class action settlements to attempt to evaluate
plaintiffs' likelihood of success on each critical issue in each case that
they review. Among other impediments, much of the evidence
produced in such cases is covered by a confidentiality order and
therefore could not be evaluated. Moreover, even if scholars were in a
position to undertake such evaluations, their results, of necessity,
would be highly subjective, and any conclusions that they reached
would be vulnerable to criticism on that basis. However, while case-
by-case evaluation of the strength of plaintiffs' cases may not be
feasible, the absence of such evaluations leads us to discount
substantially the significance of the conclusions that these scholars
have reached concerning the relative magnitude of investors'
recoveries and whether they have been significantly larger in cases in
which institutional lead plaintiffs have been involved.47
We believe that a far better-if still imperfect-yardstick exists
against which the relative "success" of class action settlements could
be measured: the total of the recognized and allowable losses
submitted to the claims administrator for any given action. 48 This
figure has considerable integrity as a measure of the damages
investors have incurred, both because the definition of allowable losses
is negotiated as part of every monetary settlement, and because class
members who believe they will be prejudiced by a proposed measure of
portion of the amounts for which they were potentially liable under the Securities Act of 1933
(which itself was much less than their potential liability under Rule 10b-5). See Jonathan Weil,
WorldCom's Ex-Directors Pony Up-Agreement in Principle To Pay Out Personal Funds Creates
Liability Precedent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at A3 (discussing the charges against Ebbers and
Sullivan). Most of the amount paid in settlement came from underwriters, whose greatest
potential liability was to bondholders for claims under the 1933 Act. See id. (discussing Citigroup
Inc.'s $2.58 billion settlement, and plaintiffs' claims for "billions of dollars in damages from 17
other bond underwriters"). Worldcom's outside directors also made contributions, in addition to
their D&O insurance coverage, equal to 20% of their assets (not including their principal
residences) with respect to 1933 Act claims. Those payments, however, totaled only about $20
million, or 0.3% of the total recovered. Id.
47. Cf. LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS 2006 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4-5 (2006), http://www.cornerstone.com/pdfl
practice securities/2006Settlements.pdf (acknowledging that the damage models on which
Cornerstone bases its estimates of potential damages in securities class actions "are not intended
to be indicative of actual damages borne by shareholders," and, as a consequence of Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., represent "increasingly imprecise proxies for potential damages claimed
by plaintiffs").
48. Every securities class action settlement that involves a monetary recovery includes a
definition of class members' allowable losses, which then serves as the basis on which the claims
administrator allocates and distributes the settlement proceeds, net of attorney fees and
expenses, after class members' claims have been submitted and reviewed.
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allowable losses have standing to contest this figure if they believe it
to be unfair. 49
The most significant conceptual problem in using total
recognized and allowable losses as a yardstick may be that, as
Professors Cox and Thomas have demonstrated, many institutional
investors apparently do not submit proof of claim forms in cases in
which they are entitled to do so. 5 0 Thus, if the percentage of the
recognized and allowable losses that class members receive is used to
measure the extent to which investors have recovered their losses in
securities class actions, total recoverable losses will be understated,
and, concomitantly, recovery percentages will be overstated.51
Nonetheless, we believe that using the percentage of total recognized
and allowable losses received by class members as the yardstick of
success-and as a measure of the impact institutional lead plaintiffs
have on investors' recoveries-would represent a far superior
approach to that used in previous academic studies. 52
The real problem with using total recognized and allowable
losses to measure relative success is practical, not conceptual. In every
settled case, the settlement administrator must compute the total
recognized and allowable losses for the plaintiff class or each subclass
in order to determine what percentage of allowable losses it should
pay out with respect to each valid claim. Moreover, although there
may be good reasons to treat as confidential the amount of each
claimant's losses, we can think of no good reason why the total losses
49. Class members also can contest a claims administrator's rejection of their claim.
50. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 871 (2002). It
seems almost certain that an even higher percentage of individual investors do not submit
claims, especially because, for many of them, the cost involved in completing a proof of claim
form may exceed whatever amount they estimate they will recover. On the other hand, the losses
such investors have incurred may well represent only a relatively trivial portion of class
members' total losses.
Another potentially significant conceptual problem is that calculations of allowable losses
generally are not adjusted to take account for the fact that one or more of the principal
defendants are insolvent or would become so if required to make good for all losses class
members have incurred. However, as noted above, current studies also are subject to this
limitation.
51. A second conceptual problem is whether attorneys' fees should be counted as part of the
recovery. Because the plaintiff in any almost successful lawsuit must pay her attorneys' fees,
either out of pocket or in the form of a contingent fee, there is a strong argument for counting
any fees awarded as part of the recovery. However, because public debate about class actions
focuses largely on whether they benefit class members or plaintiffs' attorneys primarily, in the
table that follows, infra p. 16, we count as investor recoveries only the amounts actually
distributed to class members.
52. There is little reason to believe that the proportion of class members, institutional and
individual, who fail to submit proof of claim forms varies much from case to case.
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claimed by the class (or each subclass) should not be made public,
perhaps in a post-distribution filing (or a series of filings) with the
court. 5
3
Yet that is not the current practice. In order to test our
hypothesis, and to see what results it would produce, we sought to
obtain, for almost all settlements of more than $50 million included on
the Securities Class Action Services' Top 100 list, dated December 31,
2006, 54 data on the recognized and allowable losses in each case and
the amount distributed to each class (or subclass) of claimants. 55 We
had very limited success.
Some plaintiffs' attorneys and claims administrators agreed to
provide us with the data we requested, but others-including Gilardi
and Co., which administered the largest number of the top 100
settlements, and the law firms that regularly used Gilardi's services-
declined to do so. Nonetheless, we did get allowable loss and
distribution data for eleven cases in which distributions had been
completed. They showed that, in most of these eleven cases, investors
who filed claims recovered significant percentages of their allowable
losses. More specifically, class (or subclass) members recovered: 56
0 65.5% of their recognized losses in Charter
Communications;57
53. See infra at p. 575 (recommending that courts begin to require that such information be
filed). In most cases, when the court authorizes distribution of the bulk of the settlement
proceeds, it will agree that some small percentage be held back to deal with contingencies. See,
e.g., Order Granting Lead Plaintiffs' Motion For Initial Distribution of the Net Settlement Fund
to Authorized Claimants, In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 2007 WL 3128594, at *3
(D. Md. Sept. 26, 2007) (approving hold back of 5% of settlement fund to deal with possible
contingencies). Requiring that a report be filed following the initial large distribution would
ensure that data is available on a timely basis, especially if the report states what percentage of
the fund remains to be distributed.
54. See Inst. S'holder Servs., Top 100 Securities Class Action Settlements, SEC. CLASS
ACTION SERVS. ALERT, Dec. 31, 2006. That was the most recent list available when we undertook
this portion of our research. We knew that data would not be available for the most recent
settlements, because it often takes a year or more for all claims to be processed. It also follows
that none of the data we were requesting is now available for settlements approved after
December 31, 2006.
55. In some cases we sought this information from the claims administrators; in others,
from counsel for the lead plaintiff or plaintiffs.
56. The percentages in the chart that follows are based on data provided by lead attorneys
for plaintiffs in each of these cases. The percentage recoveries reflect the amounts actually paid
to claimants. There is a strong argument that investors' recoveries also should include class
members' share of the fees paid to plaintiffs' attorneys, because class members pay no out-of-
pocket attorney fees. We have chosen to use the more conservative measure of success in this
essay.
57. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006). This reflects
plaintiffs' settlement with the primary defendants. Their claims against two secondary
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* 48% of their recognized losses in Service Corporation
International;58
* 47% and 37% of their recognized losses in Waste
Management i;59
* 35.1% of their recognized losses in Cendant;60
* 31% of their recognized losses in Raytheon;61
* 28.6% of their recognized losses in Dollar General;62
* 26.6% of their recognized losses in Xcel Energy;63
* 27% of their recognized losses in Bristol-Myers Squibb;64
* 18.9% of their recognized losses in Waste Management II;65
* 17.6% of their recognized losses in Elan;66
* 3.1% of their recognized losses in Lucent.67
defendants were dismissed. Id. at 992 (affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims against secondary defendants); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 1091 (Jan. 15, 2008) (affirming the 8th Circuit's
dismissal).
58. See Sines v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25072 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006).
59. See Mowbray v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 1999), affd,
Mowbray v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 208 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2000).
60. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).
61. See LaFata v. Raytheon Co., 147 F. App'x 258 (3d Cir. 2005).
62. This recovery includes a Fair Fund distribution from the SEC.
63. See In re Xcel Energy, Inc. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.
Minn. 2005).
64. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig.,
2006 WL 516229 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2006). This recovery includes a Fair Fund distribution from the
SEC. The private action for damages was settled during the pendency of plaintiffs' appeal of the
district court decision dismissing their complaint.
65. See Mowbray v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 194 (D. Mass. 1999), affd,
Mowbray v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 208 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2000).
66. See In re Elan Sec. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
67. See In re Lucent Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 307 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2004). Lucent
provides a good illustration of the point made above regarding defendants' solvency. Lucent is
the most widely-held public company, and potential damages were in the tens of millions. It was
bankrupt at the time the case was settled.
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS WE DID NOT ANTICIPATE
There have been six major developments since the Reform Act
was passed that we did not anticipate. Some have been external,
others not.
A. The Emergence of the Internet
The most significant unanticipated development probably has
been the emergence of the Internet as a low-cost mechanism for
plaintiffs' attorneys to communicate with investors. When we
proposed that plaintiffs' attorneys be required to distribute early
notice that a securities class action has been filed, 68 legal notices
customarily were published in a few leading newspapers. We had no
reason to believe that this would not remain the practice. Our thought
was that plaintiffs' attorneys would spend more time analyzing
potential claims before filing and that, either before or after filing,
they would discuss with potential (or existing) client institutions the
pendency of actions in which those institutions appeared to have
significant amounts at stake.
Shortly after the Act was passed, though, a plaintiffs' firm
posted notice of the filing of a class action on the Business Wire
website, and a court thereafter held that such publication satisfied the
statute's notice requirement. 69 Moreover, by this time many investors
had begun to use web-based services that allowed them to post lists of
all public companies in which they held stock or otherwise had an
interest and to receive both relatively current pricing information and
notification whenever anything was posted on the web that related to
any of those companies.70
68. The proposal in our article envisioned a somewhat different process than the process
Congress ultimately decided to mandate. We suggested that a defendant corporation be required
to compile a list of the one hundred largest purchasers of its securities during a purported class
period, and that the attorneys for the first-filing plaintiff then be required to mail a notice to
those investors. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2108-09. Congress elected to require only
that notice be published no later than twenty days after an action is filed. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(A) (2000).
69. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that
"publication on Business Wire is reasonably calculated to reach, at the least, sophisticated and
institutional investors," and holding that the "press release on Business Wire satisfied the
[statutory] requirements").
70. My Yahoo! is one of the most popular such services. It provides subscribers with an
indication of whether an issuer has been mentioned in a web filing posted within the past
twenty-four hours, and provides ready access to a link that allows them to view that filing. See
My Yahoo! Home Page, http://cm.my.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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As a consequence of these developments, the dynamics of
communications between plaintiffs' attorneys and members of the
purported class developed in a manner far different from what we had
anticipated. Plaintiffs' attorneys realized that they could use an
Internet notice that they had filed a class action to "troll" for potential
clients by including in the notice an invitation to investors to contact
the firm for additional information about the pending suit.71 Attorneys
then could attempt to recruit investors who contacted them-
especially those who appeared to have incurred substantial losses due
to the alleged fraud-to become part of a lead plaintiff "group" that
would be represented by the firm that had filed the notice. 72
B. The "Race to the Courthouse" Continues and Other Unintended
Consequences
The prospect that a law firm could use this tactic to assemble a
"group" of investors large enough to enhance the likelihood that the
law firm would be appointed lead counsel led to a continuation of the
''race to the courthouse" that Congress (and we) hoped the lead
plaintiff provisions would eliminate. Many plaintiffs' attorneys
concluded that members of a purported class were more likely to
contact the first law firm to post a notice that it had filed a class
action against some given defendant. 73 As a result, law firms have
continued to file class action complaints only days or even hours after
an announcement of some unanticipated news triggering a sharp
decline or increase in the price of a public company's stock.74
71. See MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM ACT 2028-29
(2007) [hereinafter PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION].
72. The statute provides that the presumptive lead plaintiff is the "investor or group of
investors" with the largest financial interest. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). Developments
relating to this provision are discussed below.
Published decisions include reports of instances in which plaintiffs' attorneys sought to
appoint individuals as class representatives based on information the counsel had received from
online forms that simply requested information about the individuals' purchases of the
defendant company's securities. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3624, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43146, at *242-43 (D. Tex. June 5, 2006) (noting that the individual for whom class
representative status was sought "learned of the class action on the Internet and filled out a
form online").
73. Sherrie R. Savett, The Merits Matter Most and Observations on a Changing Landscape
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 528-29 (1997)
(claiming that the race to the courthouse has ended, but then noting that plaintiffs' attorneys
commonly use early filing of notice for just the purpose described in the text).
74. To be clear, we are not saying that, as some critics of class actions alleged before the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed, a class action is almost always filed
whenever the price of a public company's stock drops or increases by more than 10%. See Joel
Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private
20081
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The continuation of early filing also was encouraged
inadvertently by the statute's provision that the "person or group of
persons" with the largest financial interest in an action should become
the presumptive lead plaintiff. 7 5 Congress based this decision in large
part on our article, in which we reported that affiliated institutional
investors-for example, several mutual funds under the same
management-often filed claims in an action. 76 We recommended that
unrelated institutional investors that had substantial stakes in a
pending action should be allowed to act together, rather than being
forced to compete to be named lead plaintiff.77
Both we and Congress should have realized that the term
"group of persons" has no precise meaning. Plaintiffs' law firms that
posted notices on the Internet and were then contacted by hundreds or
thousands of investors began to argue that all those investors
constituted a "group," and that this "group" should be appointed lead
plaintiff if its members' losses, when aggregated, were larger than
those of any other applicant or "group" of applicants. These arguments
initially were successful in several cases where courts agreed that the
meaning of the word "group" was open ended and could include large
groups of investors that plaintiffs' attorneys had assembled. 78 But
courts soon began to recognize that appointing large groups as lead
plaintiffs was inconsistent with Congress's rationale for enacting the
lead plaintiff provisions because those groups were incapable of acting
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARv. L.
REV 438, 442 (1995) ("One witness at the 1993 Senate Subcommittee hearings.., testified that
'companies can be exposed to potential litigation whenever the stock price falls by approximately
10%, even if there's absolutely no violation of securities laws .... '"). But see id. at 444 ("[E]ven a
cursory review of litigation in this field reveals that the federal courts regularly dismiss before
trial complaints whose sole substance is a description of a stock drop."). Our claim is only that in
situations where class action complaints are filed, the first complaint often is filed very shortly
after unexpected news becomes public.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (emphasis added).
76. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2090-91 n.200.
77. See id. at 2108 (suggesting that providing notice to the investors involved in the largest
transactions in the issuer's securities "would give institutional and other investors with
substantial stakes in pending class actions an opportunity to decide whether they were
interested in participating in those actions, alone or with other investors, as lead plaintiffs"). In
private conversations with staff of the Senate Banking Committee, I urged them to include a
reference to "groups" in the Committee bill.
78. See, e.g., In re Microstrategy, Inc., Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(noting that it has become a "common phenomenon" to see "'groups' of class members who form
to be named as lead plaintiffs jointly, and who seek to aggregate their losses to enhance their
chances of winning selection as lead plaintiff'); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182
F.R.D. 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Because the PSLRA does not recommend or delimit a specific
number of lead plaintiffs, the lead plaintiff decision must be made on a case-by-case basis .... ");
see also PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION, supra note 71, at 2047-48 (noting various reasons why
some courts have found for allowing the aggregation of plaintiff "groups").
2008] "LOOK WHAT'S HAPPENED TO MY BABY" 563
as effective litigation monitors.7 9 Consequently, most began to reject
lead plaintiff applications from large groups.80 Some courts continue to
appoint groups made up of a small number of unrelated investors, but
generally only do so if the group makes a showing that it has the
potential to oversee the attorneys it purportedly has retained.81
Others decline to appoint groups of unrelated individuals unless
members can show that they entered into some relationship with each
other before the lawsuit was filed.8 2
79. The Securities and Exchange Commission, through amicus briefs filed in several district
courts, played a major role in heightening courts' awareness of this problem. See, e.g., In re Baan
Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 218-35 (D.D.C. 1999) (reprinting the SEC's amicus brief as an
appendix to court's memorandum opinion).
80. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that
groups with more than five members are too large to work effectively"); Takeda v. Turbodyne
Techs. Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that a "group of persons" under
the PSLRA means "a small group of manageable size that is capable of joint decisionmaking
regarding the litigation"); see also PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION, supra note 71, at 2047
(noting that "there is a clear trend against permitting aggregation").
81. See, e.g., In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 447, 452-55 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (appointing a group of two pension funds as lead plaintiff, noting that the two funds
"would supervise a single law firm"); In re Sprint Corp. Sec. Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244
(D. Kan. 2001) (appointing a group including five pension funds as lead plaintiff); In re Bank One
S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (appointing a group of six
pension funds as lead plaintiff after noting the court's desire to avoid the suit being "run by the
lawyers and not by the client class members"); Switzenbaum v. Orbital Scis. Corp., 187 F.R.D.
246, 251 (E.D. Va. 1999) (appointing five pension funds as co-lead plaintiffs after recognizing the
group's "ability to manage class action securities fraud cases").
The Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002), complicates
this process by restricting considerably a district court's power, at least in the Ninth Circuit, to
inquire into the bona fides of a lawyer-assembled group where no other class member has
questioned the adequacy of the applicant. I had the honor of arguing that case, which involved a
writ of mandamus, on behalf of Judge Vaughan Walker in the Northern District of California.
The appellate decision, in my view, misrepresents the basis for Judge Walker's decision, which
was that the individuals who comprised the group with the largest financial interest had failed
to demonstrate that they would be adequate class representatives, not that another applicant
had negotiated a more reasonable fee arrangement. See also In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig.,
305 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (commenting on the lead plaintiff group's
subsequent decision to dismiss voluntarily the complaint seeking appointment as lead plaintiff).
82. See, e.g., In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 100-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (counting
only the losses of investors who had a familial relationship to determine which applicant had the
largest financial interest, but also allowing an unrelated individual to be a part of the lead
plaintiff group because his losses did not affect which applicant would be appointed). Courts, in
general, are willing to appoint as co-lead plaintiffs institutional investors that have agreed to
cooperate with each other in prosecuting a class action and to appoint as lead or co-lead counsel
one or more law firms that those institutions recommend. See, e.g., Barnet v. Elan Corp., PLC,
236 F.R.D. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Recognizing that the question is one of degree, several
courts have adopted a 'rule of reason' test, pursuant to which the acceptability of the proposed
'group' is tested against its ability to represent the interests of the class, and only allowed to
proceed as a group if the court determines that 'lawyer-driven' litigation is not likely to result.").
Such appointments, in our view, are consistent with the rationale underlying the lead plaintiff
provisions.
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Nonetheless, the race to be the fi;st to file-and to post a notice
of filing on the internet-continues.8 3 From this, we infer that at least
some plaintiffs' attorneys continue to find it advantageous to file
complaints, and then Internet notices, as soon as possible.
C. Timing Problems Caused by the Act's Pleading Requirements
The rise of the internet and the continuation of early filing
have given rise to an additional development that is inconsistent with
our expectations. We hypothesized that if our proposals were adopted,
plaintiffs' attorneys would have an incentive to do substantial
research about potential claims before filing complaints, because they
would then be in a better position to seek to be retained by
institutional investors that had a substantial stake in lawsuits that
they decided had merit.8 4 The continued prevalence of quickly filed
complaints makes clear that, in the vast majority of cases, relatively
little pre-filing research occurs.8 5 In addition, the competition to be the
first to file (and to post notice) frequently creates a timing problem for
institutional investors that may have an interest in seeking to be
appointed lead plaintiff. The relevant provisions of the Act provide
institutional investors with a relatively brief period in which to assess
whether a filed claim has sufficient merit to justify the investment
that an institution is likely to have to make if it chooses to seek to be
appointed lead plaintiff.8 6 For an institution committed to acting
responsibly, this assessment will focus on whether that institution,
through its attorneys, is likely to be able to acquire sufficient
information to allow it to file a post-appointment amended complaint
83. For example, on Sunday, November 4, 2007, Citigroup announced that it might have to
write off as much as $11 billion in value of securities that largely were secured by sub-prime
loans. The price of Citigroup stock declined sharply on November 5. On November 8, the first
class action complaint was filed. Press Release, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins,
Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP Files Class Action Suit Against Citigroup Inc.
(Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.csgrr.com/csgrr-cgi-bin/mil?case=citigroup.
84. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2108-09 (hypothesizing that such proposals
would "provide [the plaintiffs'] attorney an incentive-an increased chance of employment-
designed to counter any hesitation she might have about doing the prefiling investigation and
other work necessary to prepare a complaint").
85. The combination of the PSLRA's stringent pleading requirements and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 somewhat constrain the quick filing of a complaint after unexpected news is
followed by a sharp move in the price of a company's stock. An experienced plaintiffs' attorney,
however, can cobble together a complaint sufficient to satisfy Rule 11 within hours or days.
Moreover, in almost all cases the first filed complaint is superseded by a consolidated amended
complaint that lead counsel files after all actions involving similar allegations have been
consolidated and a lead plaintiff and lead counsel have been appointed.
86. The allowed period is generally no more than 60 days. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2000).
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that will satisfy the Act's stringent pleading requirements.8 7 The
difficulty of making this assessment within the relatively brief period
that the Act allows is likely to be exacerbated by many institutions'
need to follow an organized, but somewhat cumbersome,
decisionmaking process before they can decide to proceed.
We do not have sufficient information to assess with any
accuracy the extent to which such time pressures impede active
institutional investor participation in securities class actions. But the
only reasonable assumption, we believe, is that their impact to some
degree is negative.
D. Judicial Resistance to the Act's Requirements
The lead plaintiff provisions not only revolutionized class
action procedures but also constituted a congressional intrusion into
an arena that courts traditionally had controlled. Congress had the
authority to take this action,88 but some courts nonetheless chose to
resist the statute's mandate.
The most striking instance of resistance, in our view, occurred
in In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Securities Litigation, one of the
earliest cases in which a large institutional investor sought
appointment as lead plaintiff.8 9  The losses incurred by that
institution, the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association
("ColPERA"), were approximately twice as much as those of any other
applicant.90 The law firm that the institution proposed to name to
represent the class, Grant & Eisenhofer ("G&E"), organized shortly
after passage of the PSLRA to represent institutional investors in
securities class actions; accordingly, it had a limited track record.91
87. A responsible institution, we believe, would not want to be appointed lead plaintiff in an
action in which any amended complaint that it was able to file after being appointed was likely
to be dismissed.
88. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2512 (2007) ("No
decision of [the Supreme Court] ... suggests... that the Seventh Amendment inhibits Congress
from establishing whatever pleading requirements it finds appropriate for federal statutory
claims.").
89. 182 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The State of Wisconsin Investment Board had previously
succeeded in securing appointment as lead plaintiff. See Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp.
542, 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
90. In re Oxford Health Plans, 182 F.R.D. at 44-45. ColPERA's alleged losses amounted to
nearly $20 million, as compared to alleged losses in excess of $10 million by one "group"
comprised of thirty-five individuals and entities (which the court reduced to three individuals
with aggregate claimed losses of about $8.5 million), and to alleged losses amounting to nearly $3
million by the remaining applicant. Id.
91. See supra note 35.
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Judge Brieant, to whom the case was assigned, expressed
concern about what he saw as G&E's limited financial resources, and
he refused to appoint ColPERA the sole lead plaintiff and G&E the
sole lead counsel. 92 Instead, he held that the class would be better
served by having representatives of individual investors and mutual
funds, as well as a public pension fund, serve as co-lead plaintiffs and
by having their counsel serve as co-lead counsel. 93 Perhaps not
coincidentally, Milberg Weiss, which for many years had been the
most prominent firm in the plaintiffs' class action bar and was a firm
with which Judge Brieant was familiar, represented the individuals
he appointed as co-lead plaintiffs. He then appointed Milberg Weiss as
co-lead counsel. 94
District court judges similarly disregarded the statute's
mandate in a few other cases. 95 More recently, though, courts
generally have become comfortable with appointing institutional
investors to serve as lead plaintiff and, in fact, have tended to favor
them over individual applicants. In eSpeed, for example, Judge
Scheindlin held that she would not aggregate the losses of the
members of a group of unrelated individuals where a consequence of
doing so would be to "displace the institutional investors preferred by
the PSLRA."96
92. In re Oxford Health Plans, 182 F.R.D. at 45-47, 50-51. The Court worried in particular
about the possibility of ColPERA's dropping out as lead plaintiff if the costs of litigation began to
exceed the reasonable prospects of recovery, and also about the extent to which ColPERA's
fiduciary obligations to its pensioners might ultimately influence that decision. The court
declined to give any weight to G&E's representation that it and the four other firms that it had
suggested should be appointed the Executive Committee had committed to fund any costs not
funded by ColPERA. Id. at 46-47.
93. Id. at 45, 50.
94. Ironically, the Milberg Indictment alleges that Milberg Weiss had a kickback
arrangement with one of the plaintiffs it represented in the Oxford case, and eventually paid him
more than $1 million. Milberg Indictment, supra note 20, at 43.
95. In one case, the court appointed a lead plaintiff committee comprising the manager of a
state pension fund, which was also represented by G&E, and a number of individual investors
represented by a local law firm. Burke v. Ruttenberg, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1344-45 (N.D. Ala.
2000). In another action in the same district, a different judge, rather than decide which
applicant had the largest losses, ordered that the issue of whom to appoint as lead plaintiff be
resolved through a coin toss. Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., No. 98-AR-1407-S, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23619, at *8-10 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 1998). Before the appointed hour, though, the
applicants agreed to serve as co-lead plaintiffs and to have their attorneys serve as co-lead
counsel, which may well have been the result the court intended to bring about. Stipulated
[Proposed] Order Appointing Lead Plaintiff and Approving Co-Lead Counsel at 1-2, Laperriere,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23619 (filed Nov. 10, 1998).
96. In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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E. Lead Plaintiffs Who Withdraw
Another development that we did not anticipate was that
investors would apply to be named lead plaintiff but, once appointed,
would withdraw prior to certification of the plaintiff class. 97 This, too,
occurred in Oxford, where defendants' discovery efforts turned up
evidence that called into question the magnitude of some of the
individual co-lead plaintiffs' claimed losses, as well as their adequacy
and typicality. 98
The limits on discovery directed at applicants for appointment
as lead plaintiff, which we recommended and Congress adopted, may
have made it more likely that this development would occur. When we
made that recommendation, we never considered the possibility that
investors whose backgrounds were suspect would seek appointment or
that investors would misrepresent (or allow their attorneys to
misrepresent) their losses when they did so. 99 We therefore also did
not anticipate that if either of these events were to occur, and if the
designated lead plaintiff then withdrew, the court might allow lead
counsel to remain in place, even though the client that had "selected"
the firm was no longer in a position to monitor its prosecution of the
case. Yet, that is exactly what the court did in Oxford,100 and what
courts have done in a few other cases. 10 1
97. See Perino, supra note 71, at 2074-75.
98. See Karen Donovan, A Case of Ill-Fitting Oxfords? Milberg's Leading Role in Big Class
Action is Under Attack, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 2000, at Al (citing allegations in defendants' brief that
a co-lead plaintiff "filed 'misleading' affidavits to 'create the appearance that they had suffered
substantial losses' " from trading in defendants' stock).
99. In at least some instances, investors reportedly sought appointment in exchange for
promises of financial rewards from the law firm that represented them. See Peter Elkind, The
Law Firm of Hubris Hypocrisy & Greed, FORTUNE, Nov. 13, 2006, at 154, 163, 166, 170 (citing
one individual who allegedly received $6.5 million for serving as a plaintiff in about seventy
Milberg Weiss cases spanning a decade, another who received $2.4 million for also serving as a
plaintiff in about seventy cases, and another who allegedly received $2.49 million for serving as
plaintiff in about forty cases).
100. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F.R.D. 119, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(declining to re-open the lead plaintiff selection process).
101. See, e.g., In re Ins. Mgmt. Solutions Group, Inc., Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 514, 515 (M.D.
Fla. 2002) (noting the withdrawal of one of two court-appointed lead plaintiffs); In re Bank One
Sec. Litig./First Chi. S'holder Claims, 2002 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,913, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May
19, 2002) (granting the withdrawal of Evergreen Fund as lead plaintiff).
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F. The Difficulty of Determining Who Has the Largest Financial
Interest
A final problem we did not anticipate-and this is one that we
probably should have anticipated-is that determining which lead
plaintiff applicant has the largest financial interest in a case can pose
dauntingly complex problems. We based our proposals on claims-filed
data, where each investor's recognized and allowable loss could be
determined precisely, but we failed to focus on the fact that, at the
time an action is filed, precise calculation-or even reasonably precise
estimation-of investors' allowable losses simply is not feasible. 10 2
Thus, no generally accepted approach was available to the courts to
make the key determination that the statute requires: how large is
each applicant's "financial interest in the relief sought by the class"? 1 3
Courts now generally approach this problem by using the four
factor test first set forth in Lax v. First Merchants Acceptance Corp.:
"(1) the number of shares purchased [during the class period]; (2) the
number of net shares purchased [during the class period]; (3) the total
net funds expended by the plaintiffs during the class period; and (4)
the approximate losses suffered by the plaintiffs."'1 4 Where these
computations point in different directions, courts tend to emphasize
the fourth factor, viewing "the approximate losses suffered" as the best
proxy for an applicant's "financial interest in the relief sought by the
class." However, this does not get them very far because, as noted
above, no consensus exists on how best to determine the "approximate
losses" an investor has incurred.
The problem becomes even more complex because some
applicants will not have made all their purchases of the issuer's
securities during the purported class period or will not have held all
securities they purchased until the period's end. Some will have held
securities at the time the class period began and then sold some or all
of them during the class period at allegedly inflated prices (arguably
102. The problems here are similar to the problems discussed above, see supra notes 40-51
and accompanying text, relating to studies that rely on econometric models to estimate investors'
losses.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2000). The applicant that the court determines has
the largest such interest becomes the presumptive "most adequate plaintiff." Id. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). Fortunately, based on reported decisions, it appears that this determination
takes on critical importance in only a distinct minority of cases. In most cases in which more
than one investor or group applies to be named lead plaintiff, it is obvious which applicant has
the largest financial interest.
104. Lax v. First Merchs. Acceptance Corp., No. 97 C 2715, 1997 WL 461036, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 11, 1997). As of January 4, 2008, Westlaw listed seventy-two cases that had cited Lax, only
one of which had declined to follow it.
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realizing some benefit from the alleged fraud).105 Others will have
made all of their securities purchases during the class period but sold
some of those securities before that period's end. 10 6 Some may have
done both. Moreover, two common occurrences can make the
computation of applicants' losses even more complex. First, a major
portion of an applicant's losses (at least arguably) may be due to
adverse business developments, not the alleged fraud.10 7 Second,
corrective disclosures often enter the market piecemeal, rather than
all at once, and one or more applicants may have purchased or sold
securities after the first partial corrective disclosure, but before the
last.
We outline these problems not to criticize the approach that
courts have taken, but to acknowledge our own failure-and that of
Congress-to anticipate these issues and to provide courts with better
guidance as how best to grapple with the difficult task that the statute
directs them to carry out. Whether we could have come up with a
better approach to this problem than that the courts have developed,
had we given more thought to it in advance, is not something that we
attempt to address in this Article.
V. COULD WE (OR CONGRESS) HAVE DONE BETTER?
These unanticipated problems and developments, together with
the fact that Congress embraced the recommendations in our article
and then adopted the lead plaintiff provisions without any hearings
whatsoever on those provisions, have led us to wonder whether we or
Congress could have come up with a better approach to organizing the
prosecution of securities class actions. Likewise, the court's complaints
in In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Securities Litigation-that deciding
which applicant to appoint as lead plaintiff "consume[s] judicial
resources," and that, "from a public policy perspective, one might
105. The examples in this section assume a situation in which disclosure of unanticipated
bad news is followed by a drop in the price of the subject company's stock.
106. One court recently held that the Supreme Court's decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), required it to reduce an applicant's claimed losses by the
amount of losses it incurred on in-and-out trades during the class period. See In re Comverse
Tech., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 06-CV-1825 (NGG)(RER), 2007 WL 680779, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
2007).
107. For example, although a number of telecommunications companies, including
WorldCom, Qwest, and Global Crossing, clearly misrepresented material facts relating to their
businesses, it also seems clear that the losses incurred by investors in those companies, to some




question whether the right incentives are yet in place" 08-also led us
to this question.
The court in Molson Coors suggested no alternative approach
to appointing either lead plaintiff or lead counsel and also ignored
another reality: although federal judges may resent having to devote
"judicial resources"-i.e., their own time-in deciding whom to appoint
as lead plaintiff and lead counsel, some significant expenditure of
judicial resources may always be required unless courts revert to the
first-to-file rule that prevailed before the lead plaintiff provisions were
enacted. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the lead
plaintiff provisions represent the best possible solution to the problem
of how to organize the prosecution of securities class actions. Two
other recent decisions, both of which involved different kinds of
representative litigation, suggest different approaches that courts
might use.
In Nowak v. Ford Motor Co., which involved a class action
brought under ERISA, the court based its decision to appoint one of
the four competing applicants for lead plaintiff on its view that the
law firm that the applicant retained had significantly more experience
and expertise in ERISA litigation. 10 9 Meanwhile, in In re Comverse
Technology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, decided only a week earlier, the
court declined to appoint any lead plaintiff, even though one of the two
applicants had a far larger financial interest in the action than the
other, but did appoint the law firm retained by the second applicant as
lead counsel based on its conclusion that that firm had been more
diligent in investigating the relevant facts and had drafted a superior
complaint.110
Although the approaches followed in Nowak and Comverse both
have some appeal, each would generate its own set of costs and
benefits. Let us start with Nowak, where the court focused on the
experience and expertise of each applicant's counsel. On the plus side,
if these factors governed the court's choice, the plaintiff class would be
assured of representation by experienced and qualified counsel. On
the other hand, courts already scrutinize the qualifications of proposed
108. 233 F.R.D. 147, 149 n.4 (D. Del. 2005). No sophisticated observer doubts that contests
between class members to be appointed lead plaintiff often are driven in part by plaintiffs'
attorneys who aspire to be named lead counsel. But, based on private conversations with
representatives of institutional investors, we are convinced that many institutions act out of a
sincere desire, based on their sense of fiduciary responsibility, to ensure that they are named
lead plaintiff in actions in which they have a substantial amount at stake, and that a law firm in
which they have confidence is named lead counsel.
109. No. 06-11718, 2006 WL 3870399, at *356-57 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2006).
110. No. 06-CV-1849 (NGG)(RER), 2006 WL 3511375, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006).
Comverse actually involved a district court affirming a magistrate judge's decision.
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lead counsel before appointing them to represent a plaintiff class.
Moreover, basing the choice on law firms' relative experience and
expertise could give rise to a cartel-like system in which newly
organized firms and experienced firms that had not previously
represented plaintiffs in securities class actions would be precluded
from competing with the firms that comprise the established plaintiffs'
bar. In addition, many of those law firms have a great deal of
experience and expertise litigating securities class actions.
Consequently, judicial decisions about which of those firms to appoint
likely would become, or at least would appear to be, highly subjective.
For example, a judge who believed that "a bad settlement is almost
always better than a good trial" might be inclined to select law firms
that shared that point of view.111
The approach followed in Comverse, which emphasizes the
relative quality of the investigations competing law firms have carried
out and of the complaints they have drafted, would give rise to a
different set of problems. Under current rules, law firms that
specialize in representing plaintiffs in securities class actions, viewed
collectively, already engage in duplicative research because each must
decide, on its own, whether it is worthwhile to pursue a case on a
contingent fee basis. If courts began to select lead counsel on the basis
of which firm had conducted the most thorough pre-filing investigation
and had drafted the most detailed complaint, plaintiffs' attorneys
would have a strong incentive to engage in even more competitive, but
largely duplicative, research. This, in turn, would drive up their costs,
which probably would lead them to seek higher fees than they
currently receive. Investors, however, probably would not realize
significant benefits from this research, because once a firm is named
lead counsel, under current rules, it has a strong incentive to
investigate thoroughly all the claims it is charged with pursuing. 1 2
One could argue that despite these drawbacks, the approaches
followed in Nowak or Comverse nonetheless are superior to that
mandated by the PSLRA, because each gives a court considerable
discretion to decide which applicant law firm is likely to be the most
effective advocate of the interests of the plaintiff class. It is true that
some courts have interpreted the lead plaintiff provisions of the
111. In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 798
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); see supra text accompanying note 11.
112. This process also could unfairly prejudice defendants. Once a court decided that one of
several complaints was the most persuasive, it might become reluctant to grant a motion to
dismiss that same complaint. Alternatively, if a court decided that none of the complaints filed in
an action were satisfactory, it would make little sense for the court, then, to appoint as lead
counsel the firm that had prepared the best of a group of inadequate complaints.
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PSLRA in a relatively rigid fashion, 113 but one should keep in mind
that the provisions actually provide courts with enough "play in the
joints" to exercise a degree of discretion where they find it appropriate
and important to do so.
In re Enron Corp. Securities Litigation provides a striking
example of a case in which, in our view, the court did exactly that.1" 4
Several groups of institutional investors, all represented by highly
qualified and experienced plaintiffs' attorneys, applied to be named
lead plaintiff. 15 One group then decided to disband, leaving one of its
members, the Regents of the University of California ("Regents"), as
the applicant with the largest single financial interest in the action.
The Regents were represented by William Lerach, a sometimes
flamboyant plaintiffs' attorney who publicized his firm's commitment
to investigating the Enron fraud by walking into court, in front of a
bevy of television cameras, carrying a "large" carton that he claimed
was filled with the shredded remains of documents that the Enron
defendants had attempted to destroy. 116
We cannot be sure how much influence Mr. Lerach's antics had
on the court, but its opinion appointing the Regents as lead plaintiff
leads us to believe that their influence may have been considerable." 7
Other courts had appointed groups of institutional investors as co-lead
plaintiffs in several cases, 118 and the aggregate losses of some of the
applicant groups in Enron exceeded the losses claimed by the
Regents. 19 But Judge Harmon refused to allow any of the groups to
aggregate their members' losses, which allowed her to find that the
Regents had the largest financial interest of any of the applicants. 120
113. See supra note 81 (discussing In re Cavanaugh).
114. 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
115. See generally id. (discussing various plaintiffs' motions to be named lead plaintiff). Some
of them may have decided to join together at the urging of the attorneys who represented them.
We have no reason to believe, however, that any of them did so simply to advance their
attorneys' interest in being named lead counsel.
116. Leslie Wayne, Enron's Collapse: The Lawyer; Seeking Top Berth in Pursuit of Enron,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at C6.
117. The court did mention them in the decision appointing the Regents lead plaintiff and
Mr. Lerach's firm lead counsel. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. at 458.
118. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litigation, 182 F.R.D. 144, 147-48 (D.N.J. 1998), in which
a group comprised of the California Public Employees Retirement System, the New York State
Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City Pension Funds was appointed lead plaintiff.
119. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. at 454 n.31.
120. See id. at 455 (holding that the parties "have not shown that their grouping is not a
manipulated effort to aggregate larger losses than other proposed Lead Plaintiffs or to cure
certain deficiencies of [one of the applicants]").
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She appointed the Regents lead plaintiff and, per their request,
appointed Mr. Lerach's firm lead counsel. 121
Goldberger v. PXRE Group, Ltd. represents a more typical
example of the kinds of situations in which courts have exercised
discretion to appoint a lead plaintiff that the court thought would be
the most effective litigation monitor. 122 In Goldberger, an individual
investor was competing with a group comprised of two married
couples and three other individuals to be appointed lead plaintiff.123
All of the prospective lead plaintiffs agreed that the individual
applicant's losses were larger than those of any member of the group
and that the group's aggregate losses exceeded those of the
individual.124 The court acknowledged that the statute authorized it to
appoint a "group."125 It held, however, that appointing the group
before it would be inconsistent with Congress's desire to encourage
client-directed, as opposed to lawyer-directed, lawsuits: "To allow
lawyers to designate unrelated plaintiffs as a 'group' and aggregate
their financial stakes would allow and encourage lawyers to direct the
litigation."1 26  Consequently, the court appointed the individual
investor to be lead plaintiff and appointed the attorneys he had
retained to be lead counsel. 27
It remains clear, though, that the lead plaintiff provisions do
constrain considerably courts' discretion to decide whom to appoint as
lead plaintiff and lead counsel. That limitation is a necessary
byproduct of the market-based rationale underlying those provisions
of the Act. And, in those cases in which at least one applicant has a
121. Id. at 459. Her decision appears to have worked out well for members of the plaintiff
class. To date, it has secured settlements totaling more than $7 billion, mostly from secondary
defendants that allegedly were participants in a number of Enron's fraudulent schemes. A recent
Fifth Circuit decision, for which cert was denied, indicates that had Judge Harmon allowed an
interlocutory appeal of her decision refusing to dismiss the claims against those secondary
defendants, the Fifth Circuit would have ordered that those claims be dismissed. See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 394 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling on
standards for securities fraud), cert. denied, No. 06-1341, 2008 WL 169504 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2008).
122. No. 06-CV-3410 (KMK), 2007 WL 980417 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007). In Goldberger, the
court expressly stated that it believed the attorneys representing both competing applicants were
"capable of serving as lead counsel." Id. at *2. In making this comment, we do not intend to
suggest that the Regents have not exercised effective oversight in Enron. In fact, based on
private conversations, we believe that they have monitored actively the manner in which their
attorneys have prosecuted that case.
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *4.
127. Id. at *5. Several other courts have followed the same approach. See id. at *4 (citing
cases agreeing that "group" must be construed in context).
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substantial financial stake in the action, we believe that rationale
retains considerable validity.
We argued in our article that a class member with a
considerable sum at stake was likely to be more committed than a
court to ensuring that all claims asserted on behalf of the plaintiff
class were prosecuted vigorously. 128  As discussed above, the
unprecedented large settlements that plaintiffs have obtained in
numerous post-1995 cases strike us as persuasive evidence that, in
many cases, the litigation dynamic we hypothesized would develop has
come to pass.129 In our view, the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA
and the Act's pleading standards have been important forces that have
changed the landscape of securities litigation from one in which claims
that "the merits do not matter" appeared to have some plausibility to
one in which critics now spend much of their time decrying the size of
the settlements that plaintiff classes, often led by institutional lead
plaintiffs, have been able to secure.
VI. OUR BOTTOM LINE
We believe that the lead plaintiff provisions have worked
reasonably well, but we do not claim that they constitute a perfect
solution to the problem of how best to organize the prosecution of
securities class actions. We are aware of no suggestion by any court or
commentator that some alternative approach would be superior.1 30
Thus, were we to start over-or were Congress, the courts, or the SEC
to be inclined to reconsider these issues-we would again recommend
essentially the same approach. However, we also would suggest three
refinements.
Only the first requires legislative action. We believe the statute
should be amended to clarify that, whether or not one lead plaintiff
applicant seeks to demonstrate that another is inadequate or atypical,
128. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2089.
129. We are less confident that the same dynamic is present in cases in which lead plaintiffs'
losses are relatively small.
130. A group of six law professors has suggested that the SEC undertake a comprehensive
review of key issues relating to securities class actions. Notably, the extensive list of issues they
suggest the Commission consider does not include reconsidering the lead plaintiff provisions of
the PSLRA. See Letter from Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law,
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (Aug. 7, 2007), available at
http://Iaw.du.edu/jbrown/corporateGovernance/secGovernance/documents/SECAug7.pdf; see also
Langevoort Letter on the Role of Litigation to SEC Chairman Cox, Attachment (Aug. 7, 2007),
available at http://law.du.edu/jbrown/corporateGovernance/secGovernance/documents/
SECAug2.pdf. The SEC reportedly is planning to convene a roundtable early in 2008 to discuss
these issues. Kara Scannell, SEC to Study Revamp on Shareholder Suits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24,
2007, at C2.
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a court has the authority, sua sponte, to inquire into any applicant's
qualifications and to disqualify any applicant that it finds to be
inadequate or atypical. 131 Competing applicants may not ask the right
questions, and defendants, who can inquire into these issues at the
class certification stage, generally are more concerned with defeating
class certification than with ensuring that class members' interests
are represented effectively. 132 The court is far more likely to be
concerned with whether any given applicant is qualified to represent
the plaintiff class. Moreover, it makes sense to allow the court to focus
on that issue early in the litigation process, rather than leaving the
issue to be resolved much later in the process.
Our second suggestion relates to the first, but it is directed to
the courts. We believe that whenever either an individual or a
member of a group that has been appointed lead plaintiff withdraws
or is found to have misrepresented facts material to the selection of
lead plaintiff, the court, sua sponte, should reconsider its order
appointing lead plaintiff and lead counsel. If other class members
applied to be appointed lead plaintiff, the court should appoint the
applicant that had the second largest financial interest in the action,
provided that she appears to be an adequate and typical class
representative. If no other class member applied, or if none who
previously applied agrees to serve, then the court should require that
a new notice be posted and should then, following the procedures set
forth in the Act, select a new lead plaintiff from those who apply.133
131. In our view, it was on the basis of such inquiries, not the fact that one applicant had
negotiated lower attorneys' fees than another, that Judge Walker appointed a lead plaintiff in
the Copper Mountain litigation. Admittedly, the opinion explaining that decision is somewhat
ambiguous. See In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
However, when I represented Judge Walker before the Ninth Circuit, see supra note 81, I
examined the full record and concluded that concerns about adequacy, not who had negotiated
the lowest fees, provided the basis for his decision to disqualify the applicants with the largest
financial interest, all of whom were members of an attorney-organized lead plaintiff group. The
Court of Appeals, however, did not so read his decision; it held that he had chosen a lead plaintiff
improperly based on his view of which applicant had negotiated the most advantageous fee
arrangement. In re Cavanagh, 306 F.3d 726, 731-34 (9th Cir. 2002). Unfortunately, the appellate
court also went on to state that the statute effectively denies a district court any authority to
initiate inquiries into the adequacy or typicality of an applicant for appointment as lead plaintiff.
Id. Judge Wallace disagreed with this portion of the court's opinion. See id. at 741-42 (Wallace,
J., concurring). Relying on In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 263 (3d Cir. 2001), courts in
the Third Circuit, in contrast, continue to view whether a prospective lead plaintiff has
negotiated a reasonable fee arrangement as one indicator of an applicant's adequacy. See, e.g., In
re Sterling Fin. Corp. Sec. Class Action, No. 07-2171, 2007 WL 4570729, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21,
2007).
132. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2101.
133. The applicant with the largest financial interest, again, should be selected as the
presumptive "most adequate plaintiff."
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Unless the court concludes that to do so would seriously
prejudice the interests of the plaintiff class, the court should also
allow a successor lead plaintiff (subject to court approval) to decide
whether to retain as lead counsel the law firm initially appointed or to
retain a different firm. If courts made clear that they intended to so
proceed, the integrity of the lead plaintiff selection process would be
enhanced considerably. The threat that a firm would be removed as
lead counsel if its client either misrepresented facts material to its
selection as lead plaintiff or was not committed to remaining involved
throughout the course of the litigation would provide plaintiffs'
attorneys with a strong incentive to ensure both (i) that all the
information provided to a court by any lead plaintiff applicant that
they represented was accurate in all material respects and (ii) that all
such applicants understood that they had a fiduciary obligation to
oversee the litigation, not merely to facilitate selection of their
attorneys as lead counsel. 134
Our final suggestion also is directed to the courts. We argued
above that the best feasible approach to measuring the relative
success of securities class actions is to compare the funds distributed
to class members in any given case to the recognized and allowable
losses that class members have claimed. 135 We also noted that, in
every settled case, the settlement administrator has to compute both
the total allowable losses of the class or each subclass and the amount
to be distributed to that class or subclass. Settlement administrators,
however, do not routinely file that information with the court or
otherwise make it public. 136 Moreover, we found that, in most of the
cases in which we sought that information, the settlement
administrators and the attorneys who retained them are unwilling to
make it available.
We can think of no good reason why this information should
not be available to the public. Every time a court approves a monetary
settlement of a securities class action, it should order the settlement
administrator to file with the court, promptly after it has finished
distributing the bulk of the settlement proceeds and again after the
final distribution, reports setting forth total recognized and allowable
losses and the total sum distributed to the class members who claimed
134. Judge Scheindlin's thoughtful comments at the conference where I first presented these
ideas led me to revise this recommendation substantially.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. We would include, for this purpose,
distributions from SEC Fair Funds accounts and amounts derived from settlements of private
actions. Our understanding is that settlement negotiations in private actions generally reflect
defendants' agreements to make Fair Funds payments to the SEC.
136. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2104 n.250.
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those losses. Such disclosure would serve a public purpose by
increasing the transparency of the class action litigation process and
thus facilitating a more informed discussion of issues relating to the
costs and benefits of private actions for damages.

